The Appointments Clause thus functions as a restraint on Congress and as an important structural element in the separation of powers.

As an initial matter, most government employees are not officers and thus are not subject to the Appointments Clause.

Ultimately, the Freytag Court seems to have reserved the question whether the heads of non-Cabinet executive-branch agencies could be deemed to be "Heads of Departments" for purposes of the Appointments Clause.

This arrangement was challenged as unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause because the appointing party was not the Heads of the Department.

Members of Congress cannot serve as commissioners on independent agencies that have executive powers, nor can Congress itself appoint the commissioners - the Appointments Clause of the Constitution vests that power in the President.

In United States v. Germaine (1878), the Court held that 12 applied only to defendants who were officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of Article Two of the United States Constitution.

Germaine held that the phrase "Heads of Departments" in the Appointments Clause had the same referent as the phrase "principal Officer" in the Opinions Clause of Article Two.

Publius begins this essay by quoting the Appointments Clause of the proposed United States Constitution.

Pursuant to the Appointments Clause in Article II, all members of Article III tribunals are appointed by the President and are confirmed by the Senate.

The case raises an unusual question under the Constitution's Appointments Clause, which the Supreme Court has rarely had occasion to consider.